This study covers two principal research issues: First, the present study employs stock prices for TAIEX-listed financially distressed companies to estimate financial distress costs. Second, in Taiwan, besides "maintaining normal trading", the Securities and Futures Commission, Ministry of Finance is empowered to decide the modes of transaction for financially distressed companies including "cash transaction only", "suspended trading", and "delisting" which allows us to further estimate financial distress costs under different categories.
Introduction
The studies on companies' financial distress can be divided into two major categories:
The first category is to focus on forecasting financial distress. Following the pioneering work of Beaver (1966) , who built up a single-variable model, researchers attempt to develop all kinds of financial distress model such as univariate analysis of variance, multivariate analysis of variance (factor analysis, discriminant analysis etc.), regression analysis (logit model, probit model, etc.) , and neural network analysis. They attempt to detect and keep a lookout in advance before the financial distress taking place. On the other hand, the second category is to estimate costs of financial distress. The costs of financial distress can be divided into indirect and direct financial distress costs. The direct costs of financial distress are primarily composed of administrative costs, unpaid taxes/employee compensation; the indirect costs of financial distress are primarily composed of the deterioration of asset value and the loss of profitable opportunities. The present study belongs to the latter category. Nonetheless, before we move on to undertake such an endeavor. A few words as to why the estimation of the financial distress costs is of importance are in order.
According to the well-known trade-off model of corporate financing, e.g. Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984) , raising funds through debt-financing is double-edged: on the one hand, in company with a larger amount of debt financing the interest payments deductible from taxes becomes larger, hence, here comes in the tax shield effect. On the other hand, in company with a larger amount of debt financing, the default risk of unable to pay principal and interest payments due become larger, hence, here comes in the possibility of financial distress, or even, bankruptcy. Along these lines of reasoning, an underestimation of financial distress costs will mislead the decision makers in pursuing too aggressive an external financial strategy which in turn will enhance the occurrence of financial distress. In contrast, an overestimation of financial distress costs will mislead the decision-makers in adopting too conservative an external financial strategy which in turn will suppress earnings than it could be achieved otherwise. Based on discussions above, it can be clearly seen that a correct estimation of the sub-amount of each component as well as the total amount of financial costs is crucial to a sound business management. Empirically, there is no agreement on how large the overall financial distress cost is in the literature. It is hoped that the present empirical endeavor can shed some light on the unsettled issue.
The estimated direct bankruptcy costs in previous studies are between 3% and 5% of pre-bankruptcy market value of companies (Warner, 1977; Altman, 1984; Frank & Torous, 1994 ; Betker, 1997; Branch, 2002) . In contrast to the estimates of direct bankruptcy cost, fewer researchers attempt to estimate indirect bankruptcy cost (Altman, 1984; Andrade & Kaplan, 1998) . In spite of proposing a way of measuring indirect bankruptcy costs, Opler & Titman (1994) and Chen & Merville (1999) viewed the indirect bankruptcy cost might play an important part. However, Kaplan (1994) points out that the company might gain from adjusting the financial structure since the benefits so generated is greater than extra costs during the period of the financial distress. Andrade & Kaplan (1998) suggested that that negative economic shock has a significant impact on bankruptcy cost. In other words, the pure financially distressed companies, in the absence of a negative economic shock, are associated with trivial bankruptcy costs.
Based on discussions above, it remains an unsettled question as to the magnitude of the financial distress costs. Previous researchers estimate the financial distress costs by comparing the financial statements pre-and post-financial distress. However, the financial statements could fail to respond to actual change in financial position during the period of financial distress. Specifically, the reduction of asset value has not been properly taken care of.
Therefore, the financial distress costs could be substantially under-estimated. The first research issue of this study is to make use of stock price of Taiwan's listed companies to obtain a more reliable estimate of distress costs.
According to Operating Rules of The Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation 49, 50 and 50-1 stipulations, besides "maintaining normal trading", there are three possible types of change in transaction mode: (1) "cash only transaction", (2) "suspended trading", and (3)
"delisting" . With reference to change in the transaction mode, we could sort out listed financial distress companies into three mutually exclusive groups: (1) "maintaining normal trading" group; (2) "cash only transaction/suspended trading" group; (3) "delisting" group. Accordingly, our second research issue would be to concentrate on whether there are statistically significant differences in financial distress costs among the three types of financially distressed companies mentioned above.
The remaining materials of the present paper are organized in the following manner:
Section 2 provides the operational definitions of financial distress cost; Section 3 establishes the testing hypotheses; Section 4 describes the data source and empirical methodology;
Section 5 conducts empirical analysis; Section 6 provides robustness check to our major empirical results by use of CAPM estimates; Section 7 concludes the paper.
Definition of Financial Distress Costs
Opinions are divergent on the theme of the financial distress among researchers (Beaver, 1966 
Establishment of hypotheses

Estimates of Financial Distress Cost for Entire Sample
The event-study approach is employed in this present study. We first collect the financially distressed sample companies according to the date of reporting financial distress and the date of changing transaction mode. Accordingly, three observed sub-periods are formed: the period of the neighborhood of reporting financial distress; the period between the date of reporting financial distress and the date of changing transaction mode; and, the period between the date of changing transaction mode and 20 transaction days after the date of changing transaction mode. Accordingly, we estimate the average percentage change in stock price for the three sub-periods relative to the average stock prices of the base period.
To avoid a bias of estimating financial distress costs since information of financial distress might well be divulged ahead and having an impact on stock price in advent of the announcement of financial distress. We examine if the average changes in stock prices of financially distressed companies are significantly different from that of the base period during three sub-periods and the entire period to ascertain whether or not there is a reduction in shareholders' wealth as the company is experiencing financial distress.
Estimates of Financial Distress Cost from Paired Comparisons among Three Groups
On the basis of different transaction modes of sample companies, we classify the financially distressed companies into three mutually exclusive groups: 1. "maintaining normal trading", 2. "cash transaction only/suspended trading", and 3. "delisting" respectively, calculate the average stock price during the period from the date of changing transaction mode to 20 transaction days after that date relative to the average stock prices in the various base periods. Similarly, we conduct the mean difference test to determine whether the differences in financial distress costs among the above mentioned three groups are significantly different from each other. On these grounds, we establish hypotheses 2, 3, and 4
as follows: 
Expected Results
(1)The empirical analysis for entire sample
It is expected that a reduction in shareholders' wealth of financially distressed company financial report or accounting data is unfair, or the listed firms fail to obtain opinions from a chartered accountant. We are unable to determine which financial distress cost is relatively bigger of the two groups. "Delisting" group is handed down by authority for listed companies with dire financial position or problem of suspended trading can't be solved in timely fashion.
The final group is maintaining normal transaction, whose situation has not reached the standard of the changing transaction mode. We expect in the present study that the financial distress cost of "delisting" group is greater than those of maintaining normal transaction; we therefore make use of the single-tailed test. We expect to observe a similar pattern when we compare the "delisting" group with the "cash transaction only/suspended trading" group, therefore, the single-tailed test is again employed. We also expect to observe that the financial distress cost of the "cash transaction only/suspended" group is greater than those of maintaining normal transaction, therefore, the single-tailed test is again employed.
Data Source and Empirical Methodology
Data Collection and Classification
The daily stock prices of this study are collected from the publication of TSEC, main newspapers and the database of Taiwan Economic Journal. After collecting 104 TAIEX-listed financially distressed companies during the period from 1998 to 2004, we classified them into three mutually exclusive groups according to the ruling of the Securities and Futures
Commission, Ministry of Finance, including "maintaining normal trading" group, "cash transaction only/suspended trading" group and "delisting" group.
Methodology
(1) Estimates of financial distress cost
In this study, we regard the average stock price in a period ranging from one month to one year prior to the date of reporting financial distress as the base period. Accordingly, we estimate three observed sub-periods average percentage change in stock price relative to the various base periods. Finally, we make use of t-test to verify whether the financial distress cost is significantly different from zero. The formula for t statistic is as follows:
X is the actual average percentage change in stock price, while
is the expected average percentage change in stock price in the observation period (assumed to be zero).
denotes the entire sample companies and
(2) hypothesis test of paired financial distress cost Turning now to paired financial distress cost, we examine whether the paired financial distress cost is significantly different from each other among the three groups during the period from changing transaction mode and the 20 th transaction day after the change. The formula for t statistic is as follows: 
Empirical Results
Estimates of Financial Distress Cost for the Entire Sample
Based on the hypotheses proposed in section 3, we have statistical tests and the empirical results as presented in Tables 1, 2 In Table 3 Table 4 , combining Table 1, 2 day after the date of changing transaction mode. In summary, as expected, the hypothesis 1 "there is a reduction of in the aggregate shareholder wealth as the company is experiencing financial distress" has gained strong empirical support. supposedly are more effective in reflecting the change in the value of assets.
Estimates of the Financial Distress Cost from Three Paired Comparisons
As for the empirical analysis of hypotheses 2, 3, and 4, we try to ascertain whether the different types of financially distressed companies are associated with differences in magnitude in the reduction of shareholders' wealth. Empirically, we have conducted the test for paired comparisons:
(1) The paired comparison of "cash transaction only/suspended trading" group and "maintaining normal trading" group
In Table 5 , we have the cumulative average percentage change in stock price, for "cash only transaction/suspended trading" group and "maintaining normal trading" group during the period from the date of changing transaction mode up to 20 transaction day after the date of changing transaction mode respectively. We may, therefore, reasonably, conclude that "maintaining normal trading" group of which the stock price is falling at the beginning of the reporting financial distress. However, the financially distressed company "maintaining normal trading" is not experiencing a continuous deterioration in its financial situation. On the contrary, for "cash transaction only/ suspended trading" group, the financially distressed company is experiencing a continuous deterioration in stock price. Moreover, the average percentage decrease in stock price for "cash transaction only/suspended trading group" is bigger than that of "maintaining normal trading" group. In other words, average percentage decrease in stock price for the group of "cash transaction only/suspended trading" after the date of changing transaction mode is greater than average percentage decrease in stock price for the group of "maintaining normal trading", as expected. 2. "***" indicates t statistic are significant at 0.01 significance level.
3. Data source: this study (2) The paired comparison of "delisting" group and "maintaining normal trading" group
In Table 6 , we have the cumulative average percentage change in stock price, for "delisting" group and "maintaining normal trading" group during the period from the date of changing transaction mode up to 20 transaction day after the date of changing transaction mode respectively. For "delisting" group, the average percentage decrease in stock price on the date of delisting, relative to average stock price for a base period covering one year, half a year, one quarter and one month prior are -86.93%, -83.32%, -78.81%, and -70.19% in order and the cumulative average percentage decrease in stock price on the 20 th transaction day after the date of changing transaction mode , relative to average stock price for a base period covering one year, half a year, one quarter and one month prior are -92.30%, -90.24%, -87.24%, and 81.43% in order. For "maintaining normal trading" group, the average percentage decrease in stock price on the date of changing transaction mode, relative to average stock price for a base period covering one year, half a year, one quarter and one month prior are -27.61%, -16.51%, -9.72%, and -5.45% in order and the average percentage decrease in stock price on the 20 th transaction day after the date of changing transaction mode , relative to average stock price for a base period covering one year, half a year, one quarter and one month prior are -27.94%, -16.58%, -10.42%, and -6.95% in order.
As Empirically, the differences in the financial distress cost all reached significance at 0.01 significance level.
According to the results above, the financial distress cost for "delisting" group is bigger than that of "maintaining normal trading" group. That is to say, the hypothesis 3 which states the financial distress cost for the group of delisting is great than the financial distress cost for the group of maintaining normal trading after the date of changing transaction mode, as expected, has gained strong empirical support. 2. "***" indicates the mean differences are statistically significant at 0.01 significance level.
Data source: this study (3) The paired comparison of "delisting" group and "cash transaction only/suspended trading" group:
In Table 7 , we have the cumulative average accumulative percentage change in stock price, for "delisting" group and cash transaction only/suspended trading" group during the period from the date of changing transaction mode up to 20 transaction days after the date of changing transaction mode respectively.
For "delisting" group, the average percentage decrease in stock price on the date of transaction mode decision as handed down from the board of TSE, relative to average stock price for a base period covering one year, half a year, one quarter and one month prior are Accordingly, the average percentage in stock price during the period from the date of changing transaction mode to the last day of stock transaction for "delisting" group is bigger than that of "cash transaction only/suspended trading" group during the same period. That is to say, the hypothesis 4 which states the financial distress cost for the group of "delisting" is great than the financial distress cost for the group of "maintaining normal trading" after the date of changing transaction mode has gained empirical support, as expected. Based on the empirical findings, it is fair to say hypotheses 2, 3 and 4 have all gained empirical support.
A Robustness Check Resorting to the CAPM Estimates
In this section, to double-check the robustness of the earlier empirical results above, we re-estimate the financial distress costs based on CAPM model for entire sample 1 . Similar to what we did in the previous section, we now move on to conduct three paired comparisons based on CAPM estimates. The empirical results are as follows.
CAPM Estimates of the Financial Distress for the Entire Sample
As shown in 2. The t-statistics are statistically significant at 0.01 significance level.
Data source: this study.
Three Paired Comparisons of the Financial Distress Cost Based on CAPM Estimates
As for the empirical analysis of hypotheses 2, 3, and 4, we try to ascertain whether the different types of financially distressed companies are associated with differences in magnitude in the reduction of shareholders' wealth. Similar to what we did in the previous section, we have conducted three paired comparisons based on CAPM estimates:
For "cash transaction only /suspended trading" group and "maintaining normal trading" group during the period from the date of changing transaction mode up to 20 transaction day after the date of changing transaction mode, the cumulative average abnormal stock returns based on CAPM model are -57.02% and 3.29%, respectively. The t statistic for testing the difference in cumulatively average abnormal stock returns based on CAPM model of two groups is -6.45. Empirically, the differences in the financial distress cost reached significance at 0.01 significance level in a single-tailed test.
(2) The paired comparison of "delisting" group and "maintaining normal trading" group
The cumulative average abnormal stock returns based on CAPM model for "delisting"
group and "maintaining normal trading" group during the period from the date of changing transaction mode up to 20 transaction day after the date of changing transaction mode are -70.54% and 3.29%, respectively. The t statistic for testing the difference in cumulative average abnormal returns based on CAPM model of two groups is -2.25. Empirically, the differences in the financial distress cost reached significance at 0.1 significance level in a single-tailed test. Therefore, empirically the differences in the financial distress cost of financially distressed companies failed to reach statistical significance.
Comparing the empirical results between the market adjusted returns (based on CAPM model) and the percentage change in stock price as reported in section 5.2, we obtain the same empirical findings in general. To recapitulate, the major empirical findings are as follows: (1) For the entire sample, the present study finds that its shareholders' wealth is decreasing as a company experiences the financial distress. (2)The financial distress costs of the "delisting" group are largest, the financial distress costs of the "maintaining normal trading" group are lowest, and those of "cash transaction only/suspended trading" group fall somewhere in between.
Conclusions
This study is meant to obtain more comprehensive estimate of financial distress costs of the financially distressed listed companies by employing stock price in Taiwan Concerning the second research issue, the major findings are as follows: the present study finds that the financial distress costs of the "delisting" group are largest, the financial distress costs of the "maintaining normal trading" group are lowest, and those of "cash transaction only/suspended trading" group fall somewhere in between. Again, as expected, different types of financially distressed companies are associated with different degree of financial deterioration, of which the differences in magnitude in the reduction of shareholders' wealth arising from paired comparisons have all reached statistical significance.
NOTES 1 The reason we use changes in raw returns of stock as our primary estimates is that financially distressed firms usually are associated with unstable parameters, especially β, which makes the CAPM estimates highly unreliable.
